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Missing HRM: the original sin of museum reforms in Italy
Luca Zan*, Sara Bonini Baraldi** and Maria Elena Santagati*
*Department of Management, University of Bologna; **Interuniversity Department of Regional and
Urban Studies and Planning, University of Turin and Polytechnic School of Turin
The Italian Ministry of Culture has been undertaking substantial reforms in the last decades,
aimed at reorganizing both the museum sector and the local branches of the Ministry, the
Superintendence system. By reconstructing the genealogy of these reforms from a
management study perspective, the paper points out the overall misunderstanding of human
resource issues in their design and implementation. Starting from the Pompeii reform in 1997
up to the Franceschini reform in 2014-2016, the authors focus on the main inconsistencies,
omissions and mistakes undermining the effectiveness of change processes. The ‘original sin’
of museum reforms in Italy, mainly due the predominance of a legislative approach and the
lack of a management perspective by the ministerial apparatus and law makers, calls for a new
approach in organizational and HR terms.
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1. Introduction: a takeover in professional jurisdiction?
The Italian national museum system is currently undergoing a reform with the alleged intent to
radically change its structure and functioning. The reform is based on a number of new laws,
decrees and regulations modifying the organizational structure, governance, accounting and
financial rules of the ministerial bodies in charge of cultural heritage, and includes the selection of
new directors through an international competition for 30 newly-autonomous museums. A large
debate among professionals, researchers and politicians surrounds the reform, yet without
adequately placing it in the historical context of previous reforms, along with their unsolved
problems, contradictions and limits.1
1 What is now the Ministry (MiBACT, Ministry of Cultural Goods and Activities, and Tourism) has been continuously
reformed since it was created in 1975. Reconstructing the whole picture would require, if not deserve, an entire book.
That reforms can be implemented effectively with such a rate of change – a total of 25 ministries in the period – is open
to discussion.
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That Italy is a country dominated by law is not a new observation, despite years of debate.
The impressive numbers of laws (said to be about 170.000) is simply unique in the world, even in
other countries sharing the same traditions of civil law (Bonini Baraldi 2014; Pollitt and Bouckaert
2011; Kickert 2004; Panozzo 2000). More particularly, the (increasing) intrusion of administrative
law in all aspects of public sector governance has reached unprecedented levels, requiring new
projects of “administrative simplification” (Cassese, 1998), which often leave the impression of
being even more complicated than the problems they try to solve. The heritage field – or more
accurately the “cultural goods” (beni culturali) sector, in itself a specific legal construct in the
Italian administrative tradition – is not an exception.
However, there is something peculiar about the heritage field in Italy, compared to the
general process of administrative change taking place worldwide, often under the umbrella of the
New Public Management movement (Hood 1991; Kickert 1997; Hood 1995a, 1995b; Barzelay
1992; 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011): the lack of understanding of organizational and
managerial principles by Italian lawmakers. More explicitly, one could describe it as a process of
professional takeover, wherein (Italian) lawyers occupy spaces normally occupied (in the rest of the
world) by management experts. Most of public sector (and in specific cultural institutions)
administrative directors have a background in law rather than management or accounting.
Sometime their accounting knowledge is close to zero: in most legal programs there is just one
course on economics, and usually nothing about management, accounting, costs, budgets, and
human resources.
A decade’s debate about the transformation of Italian opera houses demonstrates the
possible consequences of dominance by the legalistic perspective (Sicca and Zan 2005). Rather than
addressing the issue of a more focused division of labor amongst the fourteen opera houses to
increase their efficiency, the law introduced incentives to increase the number of productions. Even
more telling from our perspective, the law introduced a new construction, the board of directors,
which was going to be in charge for four years. Unfortunately, the law was declared in June, so the
boards of the fourteen opera house were (and still are) elected and changed with this periodization.
Nobody noticed that in this way, the first and the last years would result in a financial report where
nobody is responsible for the annual results and the respective financial reports (who was
responsible? The new or the old board?). Even when this element emerged in the debate (Sicca and
Zan 2005: 60), nothing really changed. Finally, in the case of Opera houses an interesting
phenomenon emerges, what we refer to as “Italian Thatcherism” (61), whereby State subsidies are
cut, even severely, without affecting human resources. In the case of the Teatro Comunale in
Bologna, within ten years the State subsidies were reduced by 25% without significant increases of
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alternative funding: yet not a single employee was fired, nor the previous contracts changed. The
risk is that organizations have scarce resources to spend creating quality activities, apart from
paying salaries.
The above provides a very brief context for the international reader to understand the
complex and often conflicted evolution of the reforms of Italian national (i.e. State run) museums.
2. The original sin or the imprinting bias
The basic assumption of this paper is that the shortcomings of the current reform are related to its
initial imprinting: a process that was totally unable to learn from earlier mistakes and limitations
from a managerial point of view. Unfortunately, this is a quite internally consistent evolution across
the various steps of the reforms, which we will try to disentangle in the next section:
a. the continual debate prior to 1997;
b. the initial reform of Pompeii (law 1997), with major internal contradictions that were never
solved;
c. the early enlargement of (part of) the Pompeii reform to include a few large museums, the so-
called “Museum hubs” (Poli museali);
d. the tacit dismantlement of the Pompeii reform’s innovations;
e. the initial innovation of the Franceschini reform, with the “20 Directors” selection, and
subsequent changes.
In the whole process, the issue of human resources and the crucial issue of organization of
labour are left behind. Sometimes these issues are seen as boring, bureaucratic consideration, in
conflicting with the more academic content of the curator’s job.2 Sometime the innovation
introduced – as seen in the case of Pompeii in 1997 – the lack of innovation in terms of human
resource management ends up with perverse mechanisms, as we will show. In all cases, one of the
biggest surprises of the “new directors” was probably the realisation that they were not expected –
nor had the responsibility, powers and tools – to manage the staff of the museums. Their
professional experience echoes that of the first “city manager” in Pompeii, who suddenly realized
that his arrival was the only change in the whole organization of labour, and found he was not able
to take his team and trusted collaborators with him.
2 A typical position of the time is condensed in the following sentence: “They should be superintendents only for the
archaeological objects, or even the historical and artistic ones ... or even more so the environmental and architectonic
assets. Instead, they are also asked to motivate the employees, above all those which are extremely frustrated working in
the offices, or to introduce minimal rules of ‘business’ behavior” (Dell'Orso, 2002: 79).
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Optimists may say that this is a gradual process, and things will change and improve in the
future. Our view is more disenchanted: nothing improved in the past two decades. The Pompeii
reform itself was set up explicitly as an “experiment”, but nothing really was done to improve the
experiment and resolve its intrinsic limitations and contradictions, and all the weakness of the
original law continued to affect the extension of the “innovation” to the museum hubs and further
reforms.
3. Reconstructing the genealogy of reforms from a management study perspective
In this section we will revisit the various steps inside the lawmaking process in the Italian national
museums and local branches of the Ministry, in order to support our critique of the lack of
managerial understanding.
a) The debate prior to 1997
The Italian cultural heritage system has traditionally been based on a strictly centralized and
hierarchical model (D’Alessio, 1992; Bobbio, 1992). Within this model, the Ministry for Cultural
Heritage is responsible for protection on all national heritage (both public and private property) and
for the direct management of all state-owned cultural assets (including the most important
archaeological sites and museums such as Pompeii, the Uffizi and the Gallerie dell’Accademia in
Venice and the Pinacoteca di Brera in Milan) through a capillary set of local branches of the
Ministry called Superintendencies. The Superintendencies were divided by sector (one for
archaeology, fine arts, architecture etc. in each territory, usually one or more in each of the
provinces) are non-autonomous peripheral entities, and depended on the central Ministry in Rome
for all scientific, organizational economic and financial issues, including personnel. On their own,
the national museums and archaeological sites were mere offices of the Superintendencies, often
even without a specific Director in charge of their management (Zan 1999; Paolucci 1996).
There is a huge tradition of debate and discussion about the reforms of the whole system,
and major museums within them. Many contributions provide an interesting reconstruction over
decades (e.g. Bobbio 1993; Cammelli 1996; Mottola Molfino 1998; Petraroia 1998. Also worth
noting are the round table on “Reforms and decentralization in reality”, on the new journal Aedon
on 1998, and the contribution herein by Ainis, Bobbio, Cammelli, and Sciullo).
It is interesting to note how the whole debate refers tacitly to bigger museums and sites
(Pompeii, Brera, Uffizi etc.), those that are expected to be able to be self-sufficient; candidates for
self-funding given their status and dimension. In other words, there is already a misunderstanding in
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the whole debate – that managerial reforms make sense only when entities are “profitable”, or can
at least break even. The fact that the British Museum, for example, is well or badly managed, but in
any case survives without entrance fees and thus without any potential of breaking even was totally
ignored by Italian experts and politicians of the time. More specifically, any notion of
accountability and responsibility was completely foreign to the debate prior to 1997.
b) The initial reform of Pompeii (1997)
The introduction of the new law was supported by a persistent advertising campaign by the
Superintendency of Pompeii, which included the publication of the Plan for Pompeii (MIBACT,
SAP and WMF, 1997), addressing the need to stop the decay of the site, which would have required
ten years and 250 million euros. In parallel to this important document by leading archaeologists, an
administrative reform of the Superintendency was carried out. Despite the fact it was advertised as a
crucial innovation, a sort of social laboratory on an experimental basis for the whole sector of
cultural goods, directly supported by the Vice Prime Minister, the reform of Pompeii is structured
very simply in one article of a broader law (Zan 1998/2002; Ferri and Zan 2014).3 Some important
innovations were introduced, most importantly the idea of an autonomous Superintendency:
1. A Board of Director was set up: rather than relying on the single figure of the Superintendent as
had been the case in the past (and still is in many other Superintendencies), the three-member
Board created the new position of a “city manager” (in addition to the Superintendent, and the
oldest professional in the site). This figure was seen as an empowered financial director:
curiously enough, given that accounting and administration are not very sexy labels in Italy, the
press and the ministry referred to the position using the English term (“city managers”, which
normally referred to the general manager of the administration of municipalities, a quite
different position). Furthermore, the position could be covered by a temporary contract, which
meant hiring people from the private sector. This was the first time that the Ministry opened the
door to senior officials not drawn from within the ministerial body and selected by national
examinations.
2. A central innovation was that ticket revenue could now be kept by the Pompeii entity.4 Before
the introduction of the reform, the ticket was a tax collected at the periphery (the
Superintendency), then transferred to the centre (the Ministry in Rome), which then allocated
3 Law 352, 8.10.1997, Disposition on cultural goods, art 9, Measures in favor of the archaeological areas of Pompeii.
http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/97352l.htm.
4 The law is incredibly “simple”, not defining issues in details. As a field work anecdote, the first time we met the
Superintendent of that time, asking him whether he was in the position to change ticket prices, he kindly replied that he
would have asked to the Ministerial apparatus.
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resources to various peripheral entities according to an internal administrative logic. There was
no relation between ticket revenue and eventual allocations. The reform introduced a strong
incentive mechanism, and the ticket – now legally redefined as service offset – could be kept at
Pompeii to cover costs, including the costs of restoration and conservation. More tickets would
mean better opportunities for recovering Pompeii from decay. If the innovation was important in
terms of procedure, in substantive terms that also meant a huge increase of resources for
Pompeii, from the original 3 million per year allocated by the Ministry to 25 or more million
from tickets sales – a big difference!
3. For the first time, a form of accountability was introduced. Pompeii, as an autonomous entity,
was required to present a sort of financial report, where all cash transfers were presented and
accounted for, revenues as well as expenditures. This solved one of the common problems of
Italian public sector museums, that are usually considered simply “non organizations”, parts of a
higher entity, in this case the Ministry. Also, this provided increased transparency in the use of
different revenue sources which heretofore were accounted for individually, but were now
included in a single annual report.
But. There was a huge ‘but’ in the whole 1997 reform. Human resources were not included.
The responsibility for human resource management was kept at the Ministry level. Hiring, career
progression, firing – all human resource issues – would continue to be managed at the central level,
as before. There was an ad hoc national law to define the positions for the whole Ministry, at the
centre and in all the peripheral branches, including the newly-autonomous Superintendency of
Pompeii. On this critical issue, no innovation was taking place. In substantive terms, this meant that
more than a half of the expenditures spent by the Ministry on Pompeii but not managed by the
Pompeii autonomous Superintendency would not appear in the Pompeii income statement. If
entrance fee allowed for expenditures of €25 million, the cost of personnel (711 people, for a total
of €26 million as a rough estimate) remained hidden. This is not elegant (certainly when compared
to the “one-block grant” solution of the British Museum: Zan 2006): a strange business model,
according to which current revenues (tickets) covered extraordinary costs (largely to restore
Pompeii after decades of underspending); while current costs (largely labour) were covered by the
Ministry.
But much more than making the balance sheet not transparent, this decision hid a very
crucial but perverse mechanism in the law. The law meant there was no incentive for reviewing the
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organization of labour (sorely needed in institutions that have been around for centuries).5 No way
to deal with “make or buy” choices, or for redefining the boundaries of the organization though
process of in and outsourcing. For instance, if there were the possibility to provide cleaning through
buying a service from the outside rather than using internal employees, this would not be possible.
Getting rid of unnecessary labour costs – assuming that one could really do it – would only benefit
the financial situation of the Ministry, while any new services would be charged to the Pompeii,
consequently reducing resources for conservation. In this sense, the so-called managerial reform of
Pompeii was contradictory, unfinished, and “crippled” as it was referred to in jargon. It is easy to
predict, if misstaffing causing inability to spend was a major issue at the time, (Zan 1998), that it
would continue to be a problem in the future.6
It is interesting to introduce here another anecdotal element. A few month after the
promulgation of the new law in November 1997, one of the authors of this paper was writing the
first analysis on the Pompeii reform (Zan 1998/2002) during a visit at Warwick University, in
March/April 1998, following the fieldwork done between November and March. This was really at
the early stage of the new regime, with the first “city manager” having just been appointed (March
1998). As is often the case when you do research, when you start writing you piece together the
puzzle using the bits of information, documents, interviews etc., until the whole picture starts to
take shape. At that stage, the issue of the contradictory, crippled reform emerged. To double check,
the author called the Superintendent, who was surprised by this interpretation, and told him to speak
with the city manager, who suddenly realized the contradiction in the law, and the need to ask for
changes. It would have been simply a matter of three words, to “finish” the reform, and make it
consistent with a managerial logic. Despite his efforts, the law was never changed. The ‘original
sin’ – the lack of control of human resources and the organization of labour – is still in place.
Mistakes are possible, certainly, even in lawmaking, and it is hard to believe than someone
would be so perfidious as to “plan” such a bad law. Nonetheless, despite the declared
“experimental” nature of the law, the intrinsic mistake would never be resolved, and to be honest,
with hindsight, one might doubt that anybody inside the Ministry ever even understood the point!
c) Enlarging the reform: the “Museum hubs”
5 Indeed in substantive terms Pompeii show as presenting an extreme need for solving a problem of mis-staffing: out of
711 employees, only 16 were historians, architects and archeologists, the qualified skills for such a worldwide
archaeological site.
6 The small number of professionals make it hard to manage a huge number of small conservation projects, causing a
syndrome of inability to spend.
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After Pompeii, five Superintendencies were made autonomous thanks to article 8 of law 368/98: the
archaeological Superintendency of Rome (with Ministerial Decree 22 may 2001) and four special
Superintendencies for the “Museum Hubs” of Italy’s major cultural cities: Venice, Florence, Rome
and Naples (established with Ministerial Decree 11 December 2001). The Museum Hubs were
special autonomous Superintendencies with functions partially different compared to the sectorial
Superintendences (i.e. for archaeology, monuments, artistic goods): they were responsible for the
preservation and management of the collections within their museums, but not for the preservation
of the heritage (on private or public property) within their territories (as it is for the sectorial
Superintendencies). In parallel, law 368/98 established the creation of “Regional
Superintendencies”, a sort of intermediate coordination, yet without clearly defining their scientific
and administrative responsibilities (and the related resources), especially in relationship to the
sectorial Superintendencies and Museum Hubs.
The laws establishing the Museum Hubs recalled the Pompeii model both in its most
significant innovation (the Board of Directors, the Administrative Director, the financial report and
the possibility to retain the ticket income), and its more problematic aspects. Yet, if in the Pompeii
experimentation a sort of centralist legacy could still be justified, it is surprising to find the same
limits in its further extension. Indeed, notwithstanding wide debate, the autonomy designed for the
Museum Hubs did not solve the difficulties encountered at Pompeii: the Museum hubs were still
strictly dependent on the Ministry for all personnel issues, including selection, organization,
incentives etc.7
The analysis of the implementation of this mitigated autonomy conducted by one of the
authors in the Venetian Museum Hub draws attention to this and other relevant issues (Bonini
Baraldi 2007, 2014). Since its very transformation from “Historical, artistic, and demo-ethno-
anthropologic Superintendency of Venice” (the territorial sectorial Superintendency) to the
“Venetian Museum Hub”, what immediately emerged was the need for new skills, both in
quantitative and qualitative terms. This was clear, given that the management of museums,
compared to the preservation of the territorial heritage, brings with it unprecedented duties (such as
the calculations of the museums guards salaries and corollary incentives).8 The “Museum Hub”
project was ambitious in itself, calling for new curatorial (for the artistic direction of the museums)
and managerial skills (for the financial reporting and the new accounting system). Yet, due to the
7 Gherpelli himself (the first city manager of Pompeii), declared that “the autonomy conceived for Pompeii has a clear
instrumental meaning: it is a tool to obtain testable and theoretically extensible results” (Gherpelli 1999: 1), and
underlined the need to “eliminate as soon as possible the limits already visible in the law, which suffers of too many
compromises. The law can be modified, we believe that it should” (Gherpelli 1999: 7).
8 Five Museums were under responsibility of the Venetian Museum Hub: Galleria dell’Accademia, Galleria Giorgio
Franchetti, Museo d’Arte Orientale della Cà D’Orro and Museo di Palazzo Grimani.
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lack of autonomy on personnel and the block on ministerial hiring, the Venetian Museums Hub
organizational chart remained unmodified (apart from the relevant, but by no means sufficient,
figure of the Administrative Director).9 This is probably why in the strategic document requested by
the Superintendent for its constitution, the “management form” (a compulsory field within the
document) was analysed in less than six lines, while all aspects related to institutional assets,
organization, coordination, control, and accountability were completely neglected. Furthermore, in
its transformation the Museum Hub had to give up some of its employees to the recently created
Regional Superintendency and to the Superintendency for the architectonic, environmental, artistic
and demo-ethno-anthropologic heritage of Venice and the Lagoon (a newly born Superintendency –
created through the merging of two previous sectorial Superintendencies – which had inherited
from the Museum Hub the conservation function of the territory) leading to an additional drainage
of personnel.
The nomination of the Administrative Director itself encountered several obstacles,
preventing for several months the creation of the Administrative Board and, consequently, the
startup of the Museum Hub’s autonomy as a whole. Indeed, at its creation (11 December 2001), the
Venetian Museums Hub did not have anyone on its staff who actually could apply for the
position.10 At the same time, nobody applied for the post through the ministerial national exam: as
the Museums Hub Superintendent stated “to compete for this position one should have a university
Master’s degree. Once obtained, it will have very high responsibilities and very low pay: no one
would apply for a position like this” (Interview with the Museum Hub Superintendent, 16
September 2003). The impasse was only solved after a year and a half, with the voluntary transfer
of a civil servant (an archaeologist) from another national office. In the meanwhile, autonomy was
stalled, and the Museum Hub lived in a sort of “administrative limbo”.
Relevant issues regarding financial and accounting autonomy also emerged, with important
consequences at the operational level. More than one year after the Museum Hubs’ creation, the
Ministry finally issued the Regulation for their accounting and financial operations (without which
the autonomous management could not function). The Regulation (DPR 240 of 2003) established
the procedures whereby the Museum Hub could include ticket income in the financial report. Yet,
due to an oversight, this possibility was not included in the first approved version of the Urbani
Code (d.lgs. 22/01/2004, N°42), which remained unmodified until 2006.11 The problem was that
9 Document on personnel endowment (Internal Document, Venetian Museums Hub, 2003)
10 “The most qualified official we have in the administrative staff doesn’t even have a university decree” (Interview to
the Venetian Museum Hub Superintendent, 16 September 2013).
11 Based on art. 10 of this law, all earned income of national museums and sites must flow into the State financial
report, in order to be reallocated later on to each administration with Decree of the Ministry of Finance.
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the Code has greater legal force than the Regulation, effectively making the possibility to retain the
income from tickets illegal. Since the Auditors of the Superintendency could not approve a
financial statement which included the earned income, the management of the Museum Hubs has
remained blocked for a long time (Bonini Baraldi 2007). Furthermore, for the year 2004, the
Museums Hubs could benefit from state funding only on loan and, according to the law, 30% of the
earned income could still be taken by the State and subsequently re-allocated among its
administrations. Here again, reforms seem to exacerbate rather than reduce the extreme uncertainty
of financial resources that characterizes many Italian public administrations.
But the most incoherent aspect of the entire process lay in the apparent will − declared by
central leaders and politicians in the months of April-September 2003 − to suppress the newly-
established and not yet functioning Museum Hubs, and to change their institutional and managerial
form. Although just established through the law 368/98, the Museum Hubs did not appear in the
very first draft of the Urbani Code which, for the management of most important national
museums, required the creation of public-private foundations.12 In October 2003 the “danger”
seems to have finally passed: with the final drafting of the Urban Code (22/01/2004) the Museum
Hubs continued to exist. The reasons for such a change were not very clear (almost nothing
appeared in the specialist press) but it seems that a significant role was played by the Unions, to
protect the ministerial staff (interview Director of Galleria Franchetti, 24 September 2003).
To sum up, within less than five years the law for autonomy was experimented with in
Pompeii (1997) and extended to the Museum Hubs (1998); the Museums Hubs were created with
special ministerial decree (2001); the relative Regulation for the Accounting and Financial
operation was issued (May 2003); and even before the Hubs could start working (appointing the
administrative director, setting up the Board of Directors, issuing the first financial report etc.), it
was seriously thought, with proper draft law, to suppress them and transfer their functions to newly
created foundations (August-October 2003).
In general, the first years of mitigated autonomy in the Museum Hubs were very difficult
and contradictory: what emerges is a partial autonomy, characterised both by the intrinsic limits of
the instruments introduced (and already evident in the experiment of Pompeii); the enormous
difficulties in its implementation; and an ambiguous political “strategy”. In the meantime, the
Museums Hubs remained stuck in an ambitious project without personnel, resources and future.
According to a quick update with the Venetian Museum Hub, the following years have not been
better: as the Administrative Director affirms (14 January 2007) “unfortunately not much has
changed. Human resources remain the biggest problem. With fewer and fewer people, managed for
12 Article 6, comma 4, of d.lgs. 22/01/2004, N°42 first draft (never issued).
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the most part centrally, without incentives and therefore demotivated, is really difficult to follow
the road of autonomy, which becomes a daily battle”.
d) The tacit dismantlement of the Pompeii reform innovations
Bad things can get worse. This is a short summary of what happened to the Pompeii reform after its
introduction: the dismantlement/removal of a crippled reform (on these aspects see extensively
Ferry and Zan 2014, forthcoming). In updating the initial research ten years after the introduction of
the reform, a sort of social equation ironically emerges (Ferri and Zan 2014: 381): “Pompeii 2008 =
1997 Reform - City Manager - €70 million + Naples + Commissario” (we are changing the order of
factors here to follow the presentation as in point 3.b above). Numerous new events and
interventions had a negative impact on the already contradictory reform.
- First, the position of city manager gave rise to a form of political clientele in appointing the
second and third person. The second was a retired General (think in terms of skills and
knowledge management needed for such a historical site!), the third was an archaeologist (with
the result that all the three members of the board had a similar professional background, instead
of combining different viewpoints and bringing in a more managerial viewpoint, as had been the
intention of the law). Eventually, and almost silently, the position was abolished in 2007,
without any justification by the Ministry. A core part of the whole reform simply disappeared.
None of the City Managers, in any case, felt the need to present a report on their mandate (as no
doubt, no procedure required them to do so).
- Second, the revenues were not left totally to the site forever. Soon 30% was appropriated
annually by the Ministry (since 2006), in order to better subsidize the financial needs of other
sites and museums. This was a second attack on the core of the reform, showing a total
disregard for the logic of responsibility that underlined the reform (albeit not totally
consistently). Moreover, on two occasions the Ministry took away part of the savings of the site
– cash amounts that were left temporarily due to a persistent inability to spend them – and used
them for other sites (€30 million in 2006 and €40 million in 2008). That was the third attack:
taking resources away from the site, despite the logic of autonomous management. At this point,
it is not clear who can be considered responsible for what. After ten years, and receiving the
funding, was the recovery of Pompeii – called for by the Plan for Pompeii in 1997, and the call
for €250 million Euro over a period of 10 years – reached or not? Who was responsible, given
the distortion of part of the “agreed upon” resources? In any case, nobody ever had to write a
report related to the plan for Pompeii to answer any of these questions!
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- Third, in 2008 the Superintendence of Pompeii was merged with that of Naples, which was in
very poor financial shape, with the result that the tickets for Pompeii were funding the desperate
lack of funds of in Naples, rather than the site itself, once again calling into question the entire
system of responsibility and accountability that was foreseen by the law.
- Last but not least, in July 2008 the autonomy was suspended, centralizing it directly under a
Commissioner that who directly reported to the Prime Ministry, replacing the Board of
Directors, within a sort of client/patron relationship.13 After a few months, in February 2009, the
first commissioner was fired without any public explanation, and a second one was appointed.
One year later, in June 2010 the Court of Accounts (Corte dei Conti, 2010) declared that this
extraordinary administration was illegal, so the situation went back to its starting point, back to
what was left of the reform.
The whole sense of the (already crippled) reform from a management point of view was
seriously threatened. From a substantive point of view, it is interesting to notice that serious
problems of the inability to spend were still in place. When a generous amount of money was
provided in conjunction with the European Community (Franceschini, 2015) for a radical attempt to
solve Pompeii’s decay, there was a serious risk that money would have to be given back because of
the inability to spend the €105 million within the mandatory 3 years of the grant (Osser 2014;
Fantuzzi and Sironi 2015). Only the generosity of the funders, who accepted an extension of the
period, prevented this from taking place. Therefore, despite the reform, and its dismantling in
different forms, the commissario etc. many bad things did not change at all.
e) The Franceschini reform
More recently, some important innovations have been introduced by the so-called “Franceschini
reform” (in the name of the Minister in charge from 2014 to 2018), following some previous
changes.14 By its nature, the system of Superintendencies – the local branches of the Ministry – was
coupling responsibilities of protection of national heritage with direct involvement in the running of
national museums and sites. In a sense separating these two main aspects, the reform aimed at
13 It is impossible to translate the term “Commissario” in English, given the different administrative traditions. This is a
sort of extraordinary administration, often used in case of natural disaster to coordinate intervention in emergency case.
During the last two decades, this has been overused in many situations, including the art sector (e.g. Opera houses). See
Ferri (2016) for a deeper discussion on the whole experience, and Ferri & Zan (forthcoming) for a more systematic
analysis of patronage relations in extraordinary administrations.
14 See d.l. 31/05/2014 n.83; d.p.c.m 29/08/2014 n.171; D.M. 27/11/2014; DM 23/12/2014; D.M. 43 23/01/2016, D.M.
44 23/.01/2016, D.M. 113 23/02/2018.
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reorganizing both the central and peripheral administration of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism,
and creating a national museum system.
At the peripheral level, the reform changed the role of the Superintendencies, while
establishing new entities: autonomous museums, regional museum hubs and regional secretariats
(ministerial decree n. 44 23/01/2016). Superintendencies are now responsible only for the protection
of cultural heritage but not for its management and enhancement, as it was in the past.15 In parallel,
the new national museum system was structured into two main groups. A first group is composed of
thirty so-called “autonomous museums” (twenty museums as of 2014 and a further ten as of 2016),
in charge of the management and enhancement of their own heritage and collections (only the most
important museums of the country are included in this list). A second group is made up of seventeen
“regional museum hubs”, in charge of all national non-autonomous museums and heritage sites in
their region, plus all other public or private museums, through ad hoc agreements.16 Regional
secretariats replaced regional directorates, with the aim to coordinate territorial Superintendencies
and to cooperate with local authorities and other institutions in the region.
In a sense, this reform explicitly attempted to solve the most critical issues in the museum
system providing the conditions for more effective management: it required the adoption of a set of
minimum museum standards; it underlined the need for specific professional profiles, and defined
the functions to be performed within each museum (direction/management; collections care and
management, study, research and educational activities; marketing, fund raising, services to the
public and PR; administration, finance and HRM; structures, exhibits and security: DM
23/12/2014).17 In addition, each museum (autonomous or part of the regional museum hub) should
have its own statute, charter of services, and budget.18 The thirty most important museums gained
15 Other important changes are introduced for the superintendence system: Superintendencies for archaeology and
Superintendencies for fine arts and landscape merged, becoming a unique Superintendency for archaeology, fine arts
and landscape (thirty-nine in the country). Archival Superintendencies were merged with library heritage. This part of
the reform gave raise to very radical controversies by heritage professionals, according to which the reform of
superintendence would threaten their professional values and the traditional protection function of this peripheral body,
by splitting it up from the heritage management and enhancement (Montanari, 2016; Guzzo, 2018).  In January 2018,
70 of the most critical and renowned professionals signed an open letter to condemn the critical situation “Imbavagliati
soprintendenti e direttori, denunciamo noi il caos dei beni culturali” (available at :
https://emergenzacultura.org/2018/01/19/imbavagliati-soprintendenti-e-direttori-denunciamo-noi-il-caos-nei-beni-
culturali/).
16 Note the completely new meaning of the term “museum hub” in the new reform, compared to what described above
in section 4.c. The regional museum hubs aim at ensuring “the enjoyment and enhancement of cultural sites (…) by
defining common enhancement strategies and goals, in relation to the territory within its jurisdiction” (DPCM 171, 29
August 2014 ).
17 DM n.113 23/02/2018, states that “the presence of specific professional profiles (…) constitutes an essential
requirement to ensure the adequate management of a museum and the capacity to design an effective cultural project
(…). We refer to the director, the responsible for: the educational services; the administrative and economic-financial
procedures; the public relations, marketing and fund raising; the staff for reception and surveillance”.
18 Interesting enough, the latter involves the introduction in May 2017 of an integrated economic report (REI-
Rendiconto Economico Integrato), elaborated in collaboration with the BCG-Boston Consulting Group and Civicum
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the status of executive offices (“ufficio dirigenziale”), benefitting from a “scientific, financial,
accounting and organizational autonomy” (DM 44 23/12/2014).  Their Directors were selected
through international open competitions, and are supported by a board of trustees, a scientific
committee and a college of auditors.
Despite the positive attempts, many weaknesses were immediately pointed out, raising
controversies both among professionals and in the press. The Italian section of ICOM expressed
some doubts about the envisioned functional structure (i.e. the inclusion of educational activities in
the second group of functions and of marketing and fundraising in the third one). Other doubts were
raised regarding the unclear distinction between governance and management bodies, since the
Board of Trustees is ex ufficio chaired by the museum director himself (which means the controlled
is at the same time the controller: Jallà 2015). A louder controversy emerged in the press related to
the selection of the twenty (later thirty) museums directors: at the beginning because of the unusual
results (only one of the directors was drawn from the Ministry apparatus, seven of them were
foreigners and four of them were Italians working abroad: MIBACT 2015), later on, the
inconsistency of the legal norms emerged at the Regional Administrative Court regarding the
impossibility for the Ministry to hire foreign museum directors not in possession of the Italian
citizenship (TAR, Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale).19 In our opinion however, none of these
debates really tackled the heart of the problem: the inability of the reform to address the never-
ending problem of human resources. Actually, the notion of autonomy used in the reform is purely
juridical, and extremely misleading when translating it in the vocabulary of international
management studies. Following the tradition from Pompeii’s reform onward, the new directors do
not have any decision-making power with regards selection and hiring/firing/managing human
resources within their organization. At most they can make proposals about staffing (Forte, 2015),
but the related regulation has not been changed and still depends on ministerial norms and decrees.
To make the situation even more bizarre, a further event related to human resource issues
took place in May 2016 (Official Journal 4°, Open competition special series, n.41, 24 May 2016),
when an open competition to hire 500 new senior staff for the whole ministerial apparatus was
launched (the first after decades of a hiring freeze).20 Curiously enough, the call completely ignored
skills and profiles related to the functions established by the reform itself, and did not include any
Association on an experimental base. The Report was first experimented in 5 ministerial structures – 3 autonomous
museums and 3 regional museum hubs, for a total amount of 26 entities.
19 On this matter, the Regional Administrative Court has already rendered 16 decisions and the State Council other 6,
but the final decision has not yet been taken.
20 It has been noticed that when the reform was launched the average age of ministerial personnel was 55 years old
(Casini, 2017).
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managerial position.21 Since the Ministry itself acknowledged these skills as crucial for effective
museum management, it is hard to accept this as simply administrative naiveté. We believe the
omission is much worse: for the profile “promotion and communication”, any background was
considered acceptable, and postgraduate training was required in the promotion of cultural policies,
economy of art and culture, management of cultural heritage and/or communication, or 36 months
of professional experience, as if policy-management-communication skills were interchangeable.
Not surprisingly, what emerges from a quick review of the selected candidates is that the
humanistic, artistic-historical profile still prevails. Moreover, some of the candidates for the
“promotion and communication” profile took part in the same competition for different posts, for
instance as art historians or archaeologists. This might hide the fact that the “promotion and
communication officer” profile is still considered a second-best choice.
In addition to this, the special role of ALES spa has to be pointed out. ALES spa is an in-
house company of the Ministry, founded in 1997, and from 2016 incorporating also ARCUS spa
(another ministerial company), whose role is to support the Ministry of Culture in a variety of
functions, such as management and enhancement of cultural heritage, administrative and legal tasks
etc. One possible answer for the omission of administrative and managerial profiles in the call for
new staff could lie in the fact that, for the moment, the Ministry “prefers” such tasks to be
externalised and carried out by ALES staff, to whom it resorts at both at the central and peripheral
level. In this regard, some criticism has emerged, also by using ALES the Ministry appears to
bypass some administrative and financial constraints.22 ALES was in fact also subject of a
parliamentary investigation.23
Relevant problems also emerged with regards to the new peripheral organizational structure,
for instance the hierarchical relationships between the new roles of regional secretary, regional
museum hub director and autonomous museum director (Cammelli 2016; Cammelli, Piperata,
Sciullo, Sau 2016) and the relative distribution of personnel (OECD 2016).
In short, despite some encouraging results in terms of museum visitors (+31% from 2013 to
2017) which may be due to external factors such as increased tourism to Italy, and improved
financial performance (+53% in income from 2013 to 2017) which could be attributed to changing
ticketing policy, the crucial issue of human resources was once again neglected by the Franceschini
21 The following post were established: architect (130 posts), archivist (95 posts), archaeologist (90 posts), restorer (80
posts), librarian (25 posts), demo-ethno anthropologist (sic!) (5 posts), anthropologist (5 posts), art historian (40 posts)
and promotion and communication officer (30 posts).
22 According to a press release (12.07.2017) of the union federation for cultural heritage CONF-SAL UNSA, almost
60% of the staff of the general directorates are made up of ALES personnel, carrying out ordinary tasks rather than
support ones.
23 Atto n. 3-03354, pubblicato in data 20 dicembre 2016, seduta n. 735.
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reform, and the ‘original sin’ still in place. It could be argued that the problem was already present
earlier in the process: designing a reform, planning its organizational implications and providing the
adequate instruments for its implementation is after all a matter of human resources. Radically put,
the issue of human resource management requires forms of knowledge that relate not merely to
(Italian) legislation, but above all, to the knowledge developed internationally within the field of
management studies. In this sense, the Franceschini reform confirmed once again the dominance of
the legislative discourse in the Italian context (Cassese 1999; Panozzo 2000; Zan 2006; Bonini
Baraldi 2014).
4. Concluding remarks for a policy/research agenda
The reconstruction of the lack of understanding of human resource management in the whole debate
about the reform of national heritage entities (as seen from the “genealogy” of reform, from
Pompeii to the Franceschini reform, which show astonishing degrees of “internal consistency”)
provides a picture that could be summarized in the following terms:
- the dominance of legal approach and an abnormal role played by law making;
- the radical lack of understanding by Italian law makers of any notion of management, even
public sector management, as developed internationally, and its basic issue of autonomy (as
defined in the management vocabulary), accountability, responsibility and similar best practices;
- the inaccuracy of law making, with several “mistakes” made during the process (from the initial
forgetting of human resources in the Pompeii law, to the bizarre case of museum hubs and the
inconsistencies with the first version of the Urbani code);
- the inherent ‘laziness’ of law making: Pompeii was presented as an experiment – twenty years
later the main internal inconsistencies of the law have still not been solved.
If these elements explain many problems of the Italian public sector transformation, when
considering human resources another element enters into play, possibly worsening the situation: the
protectionist approach to public employment, in which the dominance of the legislative process
creates a fertile ground. The issue of human resource management is simply ignored in the
legislative reforms, as if it were a secondary issue. Behind this omission, however, there is much
more than simple inattention: there is a clear will to avoid touching longstanding vested interests. A
neo-liberal view is far from our position, yet without approaching, debating and finding sustainable
solutions for human resource and organizational issues, any reform of the heritage system will be
largely meaningless.
17
The reconstruction of events and the interpretation of this paper aims at addressing some
crucial questions for the future, both for a policy making and a research agenda. Is decentralization
seriously to be taken into account, and if so, how it will incorporate the issue of human resource
management? Is responsibility a notion that will be fully acknowledged in the process of
administrative transformation or not? And what about achieving consistent forms of accountability?
Unless these questions are addressed with honesty, courage and intelligence, the risk is that future
reforms will continue to share the flaws of those in the past, and, as a consequence, be doomed to
failure in the medium-to-long term.
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